I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
In determining the boundaries of supranational legislation some courts adopt an expansionist (dynamic) line. To take a well-known regional example, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has long been engaged in an exercise in expansionist interpretation, thus broadening the scope of European Union legislation at the expense of the political discretion of EU Member States. Copenhagen (1989) . Professor Lookofsky thanks Professor Harry Flechtner for his comments on a prior draft of this article, as well as for providing a draft of a piece authored by him on a related topic. Part III of the present paper draws upon portions of Joseph Lookofsky, Persuasive Pamesa, in EUROPE-THE NEW LEGAL REALISM (FESTSCHRIFT FOR HJALTE RASMUSSEN) (2010), and the author thanks the editors and publisher of that volume for permission to draw upon that material here. Although I have not counted heads, it seems to me that most national courts have thus far preferred narrow CISG treaty interpretation. This 12 contrasts with the expansive preference of most CISG academics, that which our German colleagues sometimes obliquely refer to as the "prevailing [collective] opinion." In the eyes of this academic majority, the real evil-13 doers are the non-expansionists, including those who advocate a greater degree of rule-competition along the borderline between the CISG and domestic law. 14 In attaching an arguably pejorative epithet to the broader brand of CISG interpretation (which its advocates prefer to dub "dynamic"), I edition to document what Professor Schwenzer describes as the "preponderant view" in England and the USA: that non-conformity "remedies under the CISG are exclusive remedies"). But the source cited by Professor Schwenzer hardly provides support for that expansionist proposition. See JOHN HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 262-63, ¶ 240 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing, in relation to a concrete example, the buyer's rights resulting from innocent representation). Regarding competition between contract and tort under English domestic law, see Part III infra. Regarding the (truly) "prevailing view" in the USA, see Pamesa Ceramica v. Yisrael Mendelson Ltd., supra note 12, 62 ("extensive and consistent American case law has, since the beginning of the twenty-first century, adopted a 'liberal' line that permits claims based on extra-contractual causes of actions").
14. The academic minority sometimes takes majority-flak for promoting anti-expansionist objectives. See , available at http://www.cisgac.com/default.php?ipkCat=128&ifkCat=148&sid=169 ("submitted that the interpreter who takes seriously the CISG's confessed purpose of unifying the law of sales, as articulated in Article 7(1), will probably exhaust all technically available means to respond to the hardship problem within the 'four corners' of the Convention, rather than resorting to the application of potentially disparate domestic legal rules and doctrines") (emphasis added).
15. pick up the latter thread and elaborate on what I see as the virtues of a nonexpansionist line of reasoning.
To avoid doubt at the outset, I am not advocating some "new [CISG] textualism" as a commercially viable alternative to expansionism (dynamism). To take one simple example: I do not interpret CISG Article 13, 19 which expressly defines a "writing" to include telegram and telex, as impliedly excluding (e.g.) telefax or e-mail from that definition. I do, 20 however, remain skeptical of truly expansionist CISG solutions unfurled under the banner of "international interpretation," as if that ratio, standing alone, could render a given CISG judgment persuasive. On the contrary, those who 21 run wild with the CISG-stretching its borders to solve controversial problems it was not designed to solve-might unwittingly provide commercial certainty-seekers with an excuse to opt out of the Convention regime altogether. application (in contravention of a key desideratum in the CISG world).
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Underlining the diverging interpretations of one much-discussed Convention rule in this category, German and Austrian courts have taken a strikingly strict (seller-friendly) stance in relation to the do-or-die rule in Article 39(1) which requires CISG buyers to provide sellers with notice of an alleged non-conformity within a "reasonable" time (or forever hold their peace). Finnish, French and American courts, on the other hand, have 30 allowed CISG buyers much more leeway, thus extending the life-span of their often legitimate non-conformity claims.
31
But even the scope of the treaty can seem uncertain-a potentially serious problem highlighted by ongoing academic disagreement about which "matters" the Convention was designed to cover (regulate), with accompanying controversy about how arguably covered matters should be "settled." Thus, although the Convention, by its own terms, governs only sales Howard Marine shows how contractual and non-contractual claims can provide an injured plaintiff with alternative theories of recovery, each capable of supporting a given claim for damages. Since the contract and tort claims are fundamentally different, the negligence-based claims of the injured party are not "absorbed" by the contractual breach-of-promise claim; on the contrary, the tort claim(s) survive even if the contract claim fails. This willingness to allow such competition between contract and tort has, in fact, been part of English judge-made law for centuries.
48
To show how a similar kind of rule-set competition can arise in the CISG context, I will now (as I did in 1991) transpose Howard Marine into an 49 international-sale-of-goods hypothetical:
Barge Capacity: English buyer (B) needs a large barge to dump clay into the sea. B asks about the carrying capacity of the vessel of a German seller (S), and S quotes the tonnage stated in Lloyd's register (the industry Bible): 1,600 tons. The sales contract, which provides for delivery in England, contains a CISG choice-of-law clause, as well as a 50 disclaimer clause, but no information regarding capacity. When B puts the barge to use, he discovers that the actual capacity is but 1,000 tons. For this reason, B's operations are delayed, its earnings are reduced, and B sues S to recover damages. 46. In other words, S did not discharge the "reversed burden of proof" under the Misrepresentation Act 1967. See G.H. TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT § 9-038 (12th ed. 2007); at English common law, however, as well as in most legal systems, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving negligence. The significance of the distinction is also well-illustrated by Pamesa Ceramica, supra note 12, discussed infra Part III.B; as regards the marine manager's insufficiently founded belief as to capacity see Howard Marine, supra note 42, 1134 ("All Mr. O'Loughlin had to do was to look at documents in Howard's possession and to read them accurately"). See also the opinion of Justice Bridge, who, having found R liable under the Misrepresentation Act, found it unnecessary to express a view on the issue of negligence at common law.
47. See Misrepresentation Act at § 2(1). 48. I.e. long before the enactment of the Misrepresentation Act; see ANDREW BURROWS, UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 24 (1998).
49. Lookofsky, supra note 41. 50. Although the Convention can in some cases apply by default even when only one party resides in a Contracting State (a conclusion which both English and German courts would likely reach in a case like this: see LOOKOFSKY, supra note 28, § 2.4), I put an opt-in clause in Barge Capacity since a barge is a "vessel" under CISG art. 2(e).
I designed Barge Capacity to highlight what I then (in 1991) saw as the writing on the CISG wall: the potential for controversy in the borderland between the Convention and domestic law, the potential competition between (international) contractual and (domestic) non-contractual rules.
Depending on how one views the Barge Capacity evidence, one might (or might not) conclude that the barge delivered by S fails to fulfill the qualityrelated obligations set forth in the contract and/or CISG Article 35, and it is 51 at least clear that this CISG-based contractual assessment supplants (preempts) the corresponding contractual rules which define a seller's obligations under the otherwise applicable domestic (sales) law. But this purely contractual pre-emption does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that B should be denied access to non-contractual remedies otherwise available under domestic law. Indeed, the CISG treaty expressly defines its own scope as solely contractual (the Convention "governs only [. . .] the rights and obligations arising from such a contract"). And since the conduct exhibited 52 by S in Barge Capacity under English law is likely to give rise to a concurrent/competing non-contractual liability claim, B might-in a forum 53 like England-be allowed to supplement its Convention-based claim with a claim grounded in the English law of tort; if, on the other hand, the issue of rule-concurrence were decided in a German forum, the result might well be different.
54
I recognize that many commentators would scorn the "English" approach in a case like this. Since, in their view, uniform Convention interpretation requires a single solution for a given set of "operative facts," they'd say the Convention should be interpreted as occupying the entire non-conformity field, thus precluding access to any domestic law. So, they might argue, if 55 the Barge Capacity buyer (B) is not entitled to a CISG remedy, then B is not entitled to any remedy. But I am not swayed by that argument. Since the Convention, by its own terms, governs only contractual matters, it was hardly designed to displace the law of delictual (tort) liability-(i.e.) a separate rule-set with its own set of operative facts. Indeed, in a case like this, I submit that a narrow CISGinterpretation is preferable. To be sure, the potential for rule-competition might, depending on the domestic laws which compete for application, sometimes lead to non-uniform results, but that risk is attributable to differences among domestic (delictual liability) rules, and those are differences which the CISG was not designed to iron out. Or to put it more simply: States which sign on to the sales Convention expressly agree to replace their domestic sales laws with the CISG treaty regime; they do not (expressly or impliedly) sign away their domestic law of tort. Pamesa: S (in Spain) manufactures and sells a large quantity of ceramic tiles to B (in Israel). B then sells the tiles to TP (an Israeli contractor) who installs them in a housing complex. Later, a latent defect in the tiles is discovered. TP replaces the tiles and then sues B for their price, the work involved in replacing them, and compensation for loss of goodwill. B then seeks to hold S liable for any compensation which B might owe TP, but S claims B's claim is time-barred.
In the first instance, the District Court found B liable to TP. It also held S 58 liable to B, thus rejecting the claim by S that B could not rely on the defect. 59. The ratio underlying this District Court holding was (a) that Pamesa (S) had been "aware" that the tiles were problematic, and (b) the 2-year cut-off period in any case only applied to contractual claims and Pamesa had been negligent in the manufacture of the tiles. Under the ULIS time-bar rule, which corresponds to CISG Article 39(2), the buyer shall lose the right to rely on a lack of conformity if he has not given notice thereof to the seller within a period of two years from the date on which the goods were handed over, and the Supreme Court held that B did not 64 satisfy that requirement. But B argued that the ULIS (like the CISG) governs 65 bought the tiles from Pamesa in 1996, and although Mendelson first sent its third party notice in 2001, the District Court upheld Mendelson's claim against Pamesa, inter alia, because the relevant cut-off rule (see text infra with note 64) was held applicable only to remedies in the contractual sphere, whereas the third party notice was also filed on the basis of a cause of action arising from the law of torts, in this case Pamesa's negligent manufacture of the tiles. The District Court also rejected Pamesa's claim in this connection because it held that Pamesa was aware of the defects in its products, but the Supreme Court reversed the District Court on this point (see text infra with note 83).
60. With the Supreme Court sitting (in this case) as the Court of Civil Appeals. Mendelson (B) appealed the finding that it was liable to Eisenberger (TP). Pamesa (S) appealed the finding that it was liable to Mendelson, the key question being whether the cut-off period of two years in the Sales Law (see infra note 64) can be "circumvented" by a buyer who does not give the requisite notice of a defect in goods and who then raises a claim against the seller/manufacturer in tort. Eisenberger appealed solely on the quantum of damages for loss of goodwill. 64. Unless the lack of conformity constituted a breach of a guarantee covering a longer period (this exception was not relevant in Pamesa).
65. First, because even though Mendelson (B) knew of the defect in 1998, it did not give Pamesa (S) notice thereof promptly after its discovery, and, second, because no notice was given within the absolute cut-off period of two years from the date on which the goods were handed over to the Mendelson in 1996. In this connection the Supreme Court also emphasized "another side" to the Hague (and CISG) cut-off provisions, which is Article 40: "The seller shall not be entitled to rely on the provisions of Articles 38 and 39 if the lack of conformity relates to facts of which he knew, or of which he could not have been unaware, and which he did not disclose." Mendelson's position, upheld by the District Court in the first instance (see supra note 59), was that the fact that Pamesa was aware of defects that had been discovered in other goods only the obligations of the seller and the buyer that derive from the parties' contract, and that the time-bar restrictions therefore do not apply to tort-based claims. Following this line of reasoning, B argued that S had been negligent because it sold defective tiles that a reasonable person would not have sold, and that S under Israeli domestic law was in breach of a duty of care to consumers who later bought the apartments in question (with the defective tiles installed).
Having determined it was too late for B to rely on the sales law provisions that concern non-conformity, the Court proceeded to examine the trial court's ruling that the time bar in question relates only to remedies in the contractual sphere. Are the ULIS rules intended to replace only domestic sale and contract laws? Or do they seek also to apply to claims in tort? To answer this question the Supreme Court again emphasized the similar content-and even similar numbering-of the corresponding rules in the CISG Convention. It was, said the Court, possible without any difficulty to draw a comparative line linking the two.
As regards the rule-competition issue, the Supreme Court first quotes Professor Schlechtriem: "The question whether the ground of liability in question falls within the scope of the [CISG] Convention must be clarified by interpretation and, since the Convention defines its own scope, it is the Convention itself which must be interpreted." As with Article 8 of ULIS, 66 Article 4 of the Vienna Convention provides: "This Convention governs only the formation of the contract of sale and the rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from such a contract." Prima facie, the Court continues, the CISG Convention does not apply to obligations in tort law-since these ostensibly do not "arise from a contract of sale." On the question of whether it is possible to file a claim in tort when the sale contract is governed by the CISG Convention, the Supreme Court proceeds to summarize the two main approaches promulgated in international academic literature. Under the first of these approaches to interpretation (the one I call expansionist), domestic The second approach is more tolerant to concurrent tort claims. Among the proponents of this position, the Court cites Professor Schlechtriem as support for an analytical distinction between, on the one hand, a claim that is intended to protect contractual interests that were created by the parties within the framework of their sales agreement (especially the duty to supply a certain quantity and quality of a product for a certain sum of money), this in contrast with tortious causes of action that are intended to protect interests not dependent on the existence of a contract. 70 Ultimately, the Court tells us, we are dealing with a complex issue, both because of the protected interests, and because of the desire to protect the international uniformity underlying the Convention. This creates a spectrum of possible balancing points. The choice between these points is affected to a large extent by the question of the approach of domestic law on the distinction between tort claims and contract claims. from which the fish suffered could not sue the seller for negligent carriage that allegedly caused the infection, even though the fish supplied caused serious damage to the buyer's stock of fish. The Israeli Court also cites a decision by a Court of Appeal in Belgium 72 where notice was not given promptly under Article 39, holding the seller could only be heard in a tort action if the alleged fault relates to a breach of a general duty of care as opposed to a contractual duty. 73 By contrast, the Supreme Court notes, extensive and consistent American case law has, since the beginning of the twenty-first century, adopted a line that permits claims based on extra-contractual causes of actions. The Court also 74 cites similar case law in Canada, as well as in Australia. 75 76 Summarizing the authorities on both sides of this difficult question, the 77 Supreme Court decides to allow the plaintiff (B) to make its claim in tort (that S was negligent in the manufacture of the tiles). The court bases this conclusion on several cogent premises, including the persuasive proposition that the tort-interests for which B seeks protection are not identical to the interests the Convention seeks to protect. There is, in other words, a basis for distinguishing between rights that were created by the parties to the contract, the protection of which we should restrict to the Convention, and the interests that the law of torts was intended to protect, which make it possible to sue for damage under domestic law. For these reasons, the Supreme Court adopts the view previously expressed in non-expansionist CISG doctrine: "The international sales contract thus has the character of private legislation, made by and for the parties in privity; this in contrast with delictual obligation and the law of tort."
78
In this case, B claimed S was negligent in manufacturing the tiles and that it shipped a product that a reasonable manufacturer would not have marketed. If S was indeed negligent in this way, this is not a negligent performance of a CISG contractual obligation, but rather-under Israeli domestic tort law-negligent performance of a general duty of care of manufacturers that does not derive from the agreement between the parties. Prima facie, there should not be an absolute (CISG) bar against such a claim. Since the seller in Pamesa "wears two hats," the Supreme Court also saw reason to cite additional academic authority as regards the distinction between a manufacturer and a seller: since "a tort action against the manufacturer is I am of the opinion that the trial court was essentially correct when it agreed to consider the claim that [S] was negligent in manufacturing the tiles in a manner that caused the various building contractors that used its products serious damage, even though it did not comply with the provisions of the Convention. I have not reached this conclusion lightly [. . .] because it can be argued that the Convention and the uniform law are intended to regulate the relationship between the parties in its entirety. But life creates complex situations that cannot easily be fitted into a predefined framework, and this leads to the attempt to distinguish between the different types of negligence. This distinction is not an easy one, and there is a concern that it will lead to a slippery slope. Notwithstanding, it should be adopted, so that justice may be done in appropriate cases. 81 For these reasons, including persuasive foreign CISG case law, the Supreme Court held that a buyer in an international sales case maintains a viably tort claim as against a seller/manufacturer for negligence even after the two year [ Had [B] given notice of the defects at the proper time, it would have benefited from the advantages of strict CISG liability, but when it failed to do so (and also failed to prove negligence on the part of [S]), it must suffer the disadvantages. That result is perhaps unsatisfactory, since the defective products were manufactured by [S]; but we are dealing with law, and anyone who does not comply with the terms of the law must suffer the consequences. 84 In Israel, as in most CISG Contracting States, the (heavy) burden of proving negligence in a case like this is not "reversed." For this reason, the Pamesa 85 Court's decision to allow competition between domestic tort law and the Convention was not outcome-determinative, nor would it be so generally, except in cases of blatantly tortuous conduct. For this reason, Contracting States (like Israel) which permit such competition between rule-sets do not unduly rock the CISG uniformity boat.
IV. HARDSHIP
A. Devaluation Nightmare
As with the contract/tort-conundrum, hardship in the CISG context has also proved to be a tough nut to crack. Although most scholars would agree that the term "hardship" refers to situations where the original contract equilibrium is subsequently disturbed (either because the cost of one party's performance has increased or because the value of the other party's 83. "Even if we adopt the assumption that the tiles that were supplied contained latent defects, and even if we assume that these were a result of a production defect, this is insufficient to impose liability in torts. As a rule, it is well known that causation in itself is not a sufficient basis for liability in torts. In view of the scale of production, the type of defects and the nature of the risk that they are likely to cause, it is not self-evident that the existence of a defect retrospectively proves negligence and a breach of a duty of care. Production without defects is not always possible, and therefore defects do not always indicate negligence; in certain cases it has even been held that the circumstances impose a greater burden on the buyer to examine the goods. We should also recall that when they arrived in Israel, the tiles were examined by the Standards Institute and were found to be of a proper standard, and at least in this respect it is not possible to accuse Pamesa [S] of negligence in not examining its products. This is no small matter, even though a question may always arise with regard to the date when the defects appeared. Finally, in the substantive and procedural circumstances of the case before us, it is hard to accept Mendelson's assumption that the existence of latent defects in the tiles necessarily proves negligence in their manufacture. Devaluation Nightmare: Party A (in State X) makes a contract to sell goods to party B (in State Y), this at a price stated in the currency of State Z. One month later, but before the parties are scheduled to exchange delivery and payment, a political crisis leads to a sudden and massive (80%) devaluation of the Z-currency, making the deal a "steal" for B, but a nightmare for A.
87
Now let's suppose that X is a CISG Contracting State and that the contract in question is subject to "the law of X." That makes the CISG applicable, but 88 does that mean that the CISG "covers" this hardship situation, such that A, due to the devaluation, might be entitled to Convention relief? To answer that question, we look first to CISG Article 79, for although the word "hardship" is not mentioned there (nor anywhere else in the Convention text) the criteria which under that provision entitle a party to a CISG liability "exemption" clearly appear relevant in a Nightmare-type situation:
A party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his obligations if he proves that the failure was due to an impediment beyond his control and that he could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or overcome it or its consequences. 90. For a well-documented account of the confusing legislative history on this point see CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 7, supra note 14, at cmt. 29 ("As to the drafting history of this provision, isolated discussion of proposals that were dismissed or the comments by some delegates may lead one to conclude that there was some type of consensus among the members of the Working Group against the doctrine of 'hardship.' In fact, some passages of the travaux préparatoires appear to indicate that the choice of the word 'impediment' was made for the purpose of adopting a unitary conception of exemption with the intention of setting aside [. . .] hardship theories based on 'changed circumstances.' Thus, according standard is not literal impossibility, but rather extreme difficulty of performance, thus opening the possibility of a liability exemption for an 91 impediment based on "hardship," at least if the economic dislocation in 92 question is sufficiently extreme.
In other words, it seems both logical and reasonable to allow a party disadvantaged by a fundamental equilibrium-alteration to invoke-though not necessarily obtain-a liability exemption under Article 79, and in 2007 this 92. As defined in the UNIDROIT Principles, art. 6.2.2: There is hardship where the occurrence of events fundamentally alters the equilibrium of the contract either because the cost of a party's performance has increased or because the value of the performance a party receives has diminished, and (a) the events occur or become known to the disadvantaged party after the conclusion of the contract; (b) the events could not reasonably have been taken into account by the disadvantaged party at the time of the conclusion of the contract; (c) the events are beyond the control of the disadvantaged party; and (d) the risk of the events was not assumed by the disadvantaged party.
93. See HONNOLD, supra note 16, at 627 (language of Article 79(1) leaves room for exemptions based on economic dislocations that constitute an "impediment" comparable to non-economic barriers).
"impediment" under Article 79(1). The language of Article 79 does not expressly equate the term "impediment" with an event that makes performance absolutely impossible. Therefore, a party that finds itself in a situation of hardship may invoke hardship as an exemption from liability under Article 79. 94 Had the Council stopped there, its Opinion would mirror the opinion of most CISG scholars on the hardship issue. The Council, however, proceeded to go further, along a far more controversial line. But before we follow the Council down that rocky road, let's consult Article 6.2.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles, so as to get some input about the effects of hardship:
In case of hardship the disadvantaged party is entitled to request renegotiations. [. . .] Upon failure to reach agreement either party may resort to the court. If the court finds hardship it may, if reasonable, terminate the contract [or] adapt the contract with a view to restoring its equilibrium. 95 Obviously, the relief associated with hardship (as codified in the Principles) is very different from the effect of an exemption under the "force majeure" rule in CISG Article 79, and the difference is so significant that UNIDROIT elected to supplement its own hardship provisions with a separate Principle (Article 7.1.7) to deal with force majeure type situations, thus underlining 96 the fact that force majeure and hardship trigger totally different remedial solutions. So, although one can easily envisage "factual situations which can 97 at the same time be considered as cases of hardship and force majeure," it is, 98 in the words of UNIDROIT, "for the party affected by these events to decide which remedy to pursue." So clearly, under the Principles at least, we can 99 94. CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 7, supra note 14, pt. 3.1. 95. See UNIDROIT Principles art. 6.2.3 (Effects of hardship), the full version of which provides as follows: (1) In case of hardship the disadvantaged party is entitled to request renegotiations. The request shall be made without undue delay and shall indicate the grounds on which it is based. (2) The request for renegotiation does not in itself entitle the disadvantaged party to withhold performance. (3) Upon failure to reach agreement within a reasonable time either party may resort to the court. (4) If the court finds hardship it may, if reasonable, (a) terminate the contract at a date and on terms to be fixed; or (b) adapt the contract with a view to restoring its equilibrium.
96. See id., art. 7.1.7, cmt. 1: "This article covers the ground covered in common law systems by the doctrines of frustration and impossibility of performance, and in civil law systems by doctrines such as force majeure, Unmöglichkeit, etc."
97. See id., art. 6.2.2, cmt. 6: "If [the party affected] invokes force majeure, it is with a view to its non-performance being excused. If, on the other hand, a party invokes hardship, this is in the first instance for the purpose of renegotiating the terms of the contract so as to allow the contract to be kept alive although on revised terms." 98. Id.
Id.
envisage factual situations where the remedies available for cases involving (i) force majeure and (ii) hardship would be allowed to compete. Returning to the factual situation in Devaluation Nightmare, let's assume that State X is Denmark-a country which does not have a specific hardship statute, but which does have a black-letter rule authorizing Danish courts to adjust the terms of any contract which has become unreasonable. Should CISG Article 79 be read as pre-empting the application of this Danish validity rule in a Nightmare-like scenario? Or should these international and 100 domestic rules be allowed to compete, so that party A (the one disadvantaged by the devaluation) gets two separate shots at hardship relief: (i) if he convinces the arbiter that the difficult-to-fulfill requirements for a CISG liability exemption are satisfied, or (ii) if he convinces the arbiter that the 101 demanding Danish requirements for adjustment of a contract made (highly) unreasonable by "hardship" are met.
102
When I constructed Devaluation Nightmare (in 2005) I knew that some prominent scholars had already rejected the idea that domestic rules of hardship should be allowed to compete with Article 79; they had, in other words, "ruled" in favor of pre-emption (without using that word). But rather 103 than hop on that scholarly bandwagon, I maintained that competition between rule-sets should remain a viable option. Just as the UNIDROIT Principles are sufficiently roomy to accommodate separate force majeure and hardship conceptions, I argued the same might be said of "Danish law" in the larger sense, especially since the CISG (which is part of Danish law) is generally not concerned with rules of validity, and since Danish domestic law deals with hardship with a validity rule.
This does not-in case you're 105 wondering-mean that I would resolve my own Nightmare scenario in favor of the party disadvantaged by the devaluation; indeed, I would not.
106
But in 2005 I did not know how a court or arbitral tribunal would deal with a real Nightmare-type situation, since (at that point in time) I hadn't seen the hardship issue resolved in a real CISG case. But even in the absence of 107 such precedent, some (Common law trained) commentators, emphasizing what they see as the distinctly "Civilian" nature of hardship-tailored remedies (contract renegotiation and adjustment), maintain that proposals to include 108 such remedies were considered but rejected during the drafting of Article 79. In the eyes of these commentators the matter of economic dislocations 109 in a CISG context is solely governed and expressly settled by Article 79, so for them, the only remedy which might be available for the victim of an (extreme) economic dislocation in a CISG case is a CISG liability exemption. 110 Now, I do not agree with these commentators' interpretation of the CISG legislative history, nor can I accept their position that the CISG regime preempts domestic hardship rules. Like them, however, I reject the (for me outlandish) proposition that the CISG itself provides authority for a court or arbitrator to order renegotiation and/or adjustment of a CISG contract. But this tribunals and scholars agree that a reference to (e.g.) "Swiss law" or the "law of Switzerland" includes a reference to the CISG. See LOOKOFSKY, supra note 20, at § 2.7. But see Walt, supra note 17, at 325 n.4.
105. Regarding § 36 of the Danish Contracts Act (which in a sufficiently "extreme" domestic context might be allowed to compete with the force majeure provision in the Danish Sales Act); see Lookofsky, supra note 100, at 494-98; see also ANDERSEN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 102, at 190-96 (comparing a domestic sales law precedent from 1940 with a non-sales hardship precedent from 2008 and more generally emphasizing the fundamental remedial differences between force majeure and hardship).
106. And judging by domestic precedent (see preceding note), I am quite sure that a Danish court faced with this scenario would not either.
107. In this connection, I expressly discounted an earlier Italian precedent as largely irrelevant, since I regarded (and still regard) the hardship-portion of the opinion rendered there as (unpersuasive) dictum, as opposed to an outcome-determinative holding. See the hardship issue by CISG means would leave "no alternative" other than resort to domestic legal rules, the Council simply declares a CISG-based solution to be "more palatable" than the alternative of leaving the question to the conflict of law rules of the forum, especially given the great diversity of potentially applicable legal doctrines. Indeed, according to the Council, "the interpreter who takes seriously the CISG's confessed purpose of unifying the law of sales, as articulated in Article 7(1), will probably exhaust all technically available means to respond to the hardship problem within the 'four corners' of the Convention, rather than resorting to the application of potentially disparate domestic legal rules and doctrines." But seriously 119 folks, CISG expansionists regularly "exhaust all means" to achieve preemption, in this case not only by twisting CISG Article 7(2), but also by overinterpreting Article 7(1) which only requires some unspecified measure of "regard" to the need for uniform interpretation, as opposed to "paramount" regard (as the Council would prefer to have us read it).
120
Hardship, the Council concedes, may be regarded in some legal systems as a validity-related issue, and so "it may be argued that the hardship issue is excluded from the scope of application of the CISG by virtue of Article 4."
121
In fact, the Council even thinks this argument "deserves careful consideration," because in some Scandinavian legal systems the issue of hardship is in fact approached as an issue of validity, and since there is 122 "something to be said" (thank you) in favor of granting the defaulting party the benefit of finding appropriate relief by choosing among competing domestic doctrines of hardship. And yet, this Scandinavian approach "does not sound convincing or persuasive," at least not in the Council-collective's expansive set of ears.
123
For these reasons, the Council opines that the Nightmare situation deserves a legal response under the Convention that would pre-empt the application of domestic rules on hardship. And to tackle that challenge-to 124 "ascertain the contours of the remedial guidelines that may be followed to grant the most appropriate [hardship] remedy"-the Council infers, from the obligation to interpret the Convention in good faith under Article 7(1), a duty imposed upon the parties to renegotiate the terms of the contract with a view to restore a balance of the performances. : "Unlike a situation of unconscionability (. . . or gross disparity of the performances at the time the contract is concluded), which clearly falls under the rubric of validity, the hardship problem tends to be associated in most legal systems with force majeure or impossibility of performance, that is, a situation of exoneration or mitigation of liability due to events subsequent to the conclusion of the contract, more than as a case of nullity or avoidance due to infirmities or flaws affecting the contract from its inception. Moreover, every benefit potentially obtained from allowing national doctrines of hardship to compete for its application is more than offset by the high price in terms of uniformity that is to be paid under this approach." 124. Scafom: Seller (S) contracts to sell steel tubes to buyer (B) at a given price. Later, the market price of the steel used by S to produce those tubes suddenly jumps up by some 70%. When B refuses to accede to a demand by S to renegotiate, S sues B, demanding that the court award damages suffered as a result of B's refusal.
In Scafom S and B have their main places of business in different CISG Contracting States, and since these parties have not opted out, the CISG clearly apples. What is less clear, however, is how the court should deal with the hardship problem in this particular case. On the one hand, I doubt that many arbiters would consider a 70 (or even 80) % price-increase to be sufficiently extreme to warrant a liability exemption for S under Article 79 (which means that S in Scafom should remain strictly liable in damages for its failure to deliver the goods to the buyer at the originally agreed contract price); on the other hand, I assume that many arbiters would say (using 129 hardship terminology) that the price increase in Scafom "fundamentally alters the equilibrium" of the contract.
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But this latter assumption need not necessarily imply that the Scafom seller (S) is entitled to demand renegotiation of the contract and/or that a Belgian court should adjust the original contract price. This is because the assumption of a fundamental alteration of the contract equilibrium in Scafom does not automatically lead to hardship relief. Indeed, the hardship scenario in Scafom will only trigger hardship effects if the default rule which the court holds applicable-be that CISG Article 79, UNIDROIT Principles Article 6.2.3 or a domestic (hardship or hardship-related) rule-can be interpreted as prescribing such effects.
(Note in this connection that the buyer in Scafom had not accepted the price-adjustment clause in the French seller's standard terms, nor had such 131 a clause become part of the contract by virtue of commercial usage. For 132 these reasons, the Belgian Court was obligated to determine whether or not to grant the seller relief on the basis of a gap-filling rule. ) 133 So, once again, the possible hardship solutions abound. Distinguished American CISG scholars, for example, would solve the hardship problem in Scafom within the "black letter" of Article 79, thus leaving no room for supplementary solutions divined from unwritten CISG general principles. 134 At the same time, these American scholars adamantly reject the views of European scholars who seem to read "civil law" hardship doctrine into Article 79, a point which might raise some Civilian eyebrows, since this Having read countless opinions rendered by Danish courts-nearly all brief, some also opaque -I hesitate to criticize the ratio of the highest 141 Belgian Court. But the Scafom opinion has already attracted some cogent criticism, and viewed from my own perspective, this Belgian decision 142 hardly seems more persuasive than the rambling Advisory Council Opinion on the same subject. 143 Applauding the Scafom result, but not the method used by the Cour to reach it, one commentator would expand the hardship potpourri by using international (UNIDROIT) principles to interpret domestic law. Quite apart 144 from my own "Scandinavian" solution (using-if appropriate in sufficiently extreme situations-a domestic validity rule to supplement the CISG), I 145 have also suggested that non-expansionist arbiters might achieve a viable "international" solution to a given governed-but-not-settled conundrum by supplementing the CISG regime with lex mercatoria as a CISG-independent supplement. I realize, however, that this particular road might only be 146 accessible by an international arbitral tribunal functioning within a liberal lex arbitri climate, i.e. a dispute resolution environment where rigid choice-of-law methodologies (such as those of the Rome I Regulation) need not be applied. At the same time, I would caution that not all arbitrators would 147 regard UNIDROIT hardship remedies as reflecting truly "international" lex mercatoria. 148 
V. CONCLUSION
The CISG core content seems clear and familiar. But due to differences among existing domestic conceptions, the Convention founders sometimes opted for compromise, not least to avoid the alternative of no Convention at all. So, for better or for worse, some CISG provisions were formulated in 149 open-ended fashion, whereas other issues were left untouched and unresolved, with some loose ends even tucked under the CISG rug. And so it should 150 hardly seem surprising that we find continuing controversy and debate along the borderline between the CISG and domestic law.
Fortunately (for all of us who support the Convention), the great majority of international sales disputes will continue to revolve around everyday sales law claims, (e.g.) that the goods delivered do not conform to the contract; that they have not been delivered on time; etc. In these familiar contexts, the Convention will continue to provide a reasonably level default playing field for resolving problems of greatest practical importance. When it comes to more controversial CISG borderline issues, however, we must travel a winding and bumpier road. Indeed, given the sharply differing opinions on how to resolve some of these issues, I think lawyers who plan ahead-and who prefer well-defined rules to unwritten CISG principles-might do well to equip their clients' contracts with choice-of-forum clauses, perhaps coupled with choiceof-law clauses which expressly supplement the CISG with domestic law. 151 I realize that expansionist academics might discount the need for (and effect of) such clauses, since in their view the Convention "settles" most borderline issues without resort to domestic law; I also realize that the Scafom decision might further energize those same academics. Still, I doubt that many non-Belgian courts or arbitrators would be likely to follow that Cour de cassation lead. With no supranational court to keep the international community in line, courts in Contracting States need only have "regard" to decisions rendered by courts in other CISG States. And since the treaty does 152 not tell national courts how much regard to have for foreign (e.g. Belgian) case law, I have argued that the relevant measure should depend on various factors, including not only the prominence of the court, but also the force of its reasoning and the apparent soundness of the result. 153 I concede my argument is influenced by the American and Scandinavian doctrine with which I am most familiar. Still, I think the logic underlying 154 this national doctrine also rings true here, although persuasiveness in the CISG context should of course include an appropriate measure of regard to the Convention's international character and the need to promote uniformity in its application. And although I would not overestimate the foreign impact of the Israeli Supreme Court's decision in Pamesa, I think it and similarly wellreasoned decisions might perhaps persuade some whose positions along the borderline are not yet entrenched. Even a few small steps in that direction would-in my opinion-be an encouraging development for international private law.
